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Abstract 
We propose algorithms to create adversarial attacks to assess model robustness in text classification 
problems.  They can be used to create white box attacks and black box attacks while at the same time 
preserving the semantics and syntax of the original text. The attacks cause significant number of flips in 
white-box setting and same rule based can be used in black-box setting.  In a black-box setting, the attacks 
created are able to reverse decisions of transformer based architectures. 
1 Introduction and Literature Review 
Training data, on which machine learning models are developed, are sometimes not representative of the 
datasets of interest or future datasets. This causes the models to yield poor predictions on the unseen 
data. It has been seen in the literature [1] that minute perturbations in the training data can cause the 
model’s performance to drop significantly. By systematically creating such perturbations, one can assess 
and create robust models through a process called adversarial training [1].  Adversarial training can help 
us learn the behavior of our models and the decision boundaries where breakdown in robustness occurs.  
Similar concerns related to model robustness have also been investigated in Natural Language Processing 
(NLP). Some of the papers that study these perturbations include characters level changes [2], word level 
changes [3, 4], and sentence level changes [5]. Table 1 shows selected examples of adversarial attacks 
(perturbations) and the corresponding degradation in model performance (classification as negative). For 
example, replacing the word ”good” by “fantastic“ changes the probability of being classified as negative 
from 0.56 to 0.33. Similarly, adding the word “highly” in front of “trustworthy” causes a drastic decrease 
in the probability from 0.91 to 0.48. 
Along with this, different NLP applications have also been tested, including Text Classification [2, 4], 
Machine Translation [5], and Question Answering. [6] The collection of research related to adversarial 
learning can be broadly divided into two categories, with respect to how adversaries are created and the 
amount of model information available. If adversarial inputs are created by using the model information, 
they are called “white box attacks”. Perhaps the more interesting category is one in which nothing is 
known about the model. These are called as “black box attacks”. We will also refer to them as “supervised 
and unsupervised perturbations” of the data. 
Research in adversarial attacks for deep learning models started with the introduction of a brute force 
attack to change the model prediction [7].   Since then, research in this field has exploded and many 
different types of attacks have been explored.  Adversaries are created using different definitions of 
distance between the original input and perturbed input, including L0, L1 and L2 norms [8].  While there 
are many types of perturbations including random ones, the most common white-box attacks are 
gradient-based [1] that use projected gradient information in the model to determine the “best” 
perturbation and create adversaries.  
These and similar ideas in the field of adversarial training have also been used in the NLP community for 
assessing robustness of models for unstructured data.  These include strategies that apply insertion, 
modification, and removal of characters [2]. The actual choices of words or characters to perturb are 
selected using the highest gradient of the cost (loss) function. These can be directed attacks in which 
changes are only focused on certain types of words based on their Parts-of-Speech (PoS) tag. Examples 
include: i) only adverbs with the highest gradient for creating perturbations and insertion of text in the 
document [3]; ii) Jacobian based saliency attack [9] to find words that have the same sign in the 
embedding space as the sign of the Jacobian of the outputs from the final layer of the model before the 
final decision; iii) character level changes that cause maximum perturbations using derivatives as a 
surrogate loss for character based models and this method can be extended to word level changes [4].  
There have also been development of black box attacks. Semantically equivalent adversarial rules (SeAR) 
were successfully created by using only paraphrase modeling and the final model decision information 
[10]. Genetic algorithms have been applied along with paraphrase models to create diverse adversaries. 
[11] One recent algorithm even explores the concept of universal triggers that, when added to every text 
instance, can alter the model behavior significantly. [12] 
This paper presents novel algorithms to perform adversarial testing of NLP text classification models. The 
results can be easily extended to other NLP tasks. The main contributions of the paper are: 
 Methods to create both white-box and black-box attacks for NLP text classification problems.  
 
Table 1: Two examples of model non-robustness behavior observed by creating adversarial attacks from 
the rule-based trigger algorithm. The words highlighted with color yellow and green represent the original 
word and its replacement respectively. The probability values of the model (represent the model’s 
probability p(y|x)) for both the original and perturbed messages 
Original Text Adversarial Text 
The device is easy to use, but selection of a 
station to listen to with good reception is 
difficult.  
 
Probability = 0.556183 
The device is easy to use, but selection of a 
station to listen to with fantastic reception is 
difficult.  
 
Probability = 0.325465 
Disc after disc, burn after burn, Sony CD-R's just. 
don't. work. If nothing else, they're consistent. 
Why doesn't anybody sell trustworthy products 
anymore? 
 
 
Probability = 0.912351 
Disc after disc, burn after burn, Sony CD-R's just. 
don't. work. If nothing else, they're consistent. 
Why doesn't anybody sell highly 
trustworthy products anymore? 
 
 
Probability = 0.475465 
 
 Two new algorithms that can be used with any deep learning model to create a wide range of 
adversaries. 
 A sequence of checks (or steps) to maintain the semantic nature of the adversaries relative to the 
original text. We use a combination of embedding information, semantic polarity, PoS tagging 
information and mask language model predictions to keep the semantic information intact. 
We also show that the adversaries that are created can be used to develop general rules about the data, 
which can later be used for black box models.  
Table 2 provides a collection of abbreviations and their definitions. These will be used throughout the 
paper. 
Table 2: Abbreviations that will be used frequently in the paper and their definitions 
Abbreviations Definitions 
Adj: Adjective 
NN: Noun 
Adv: Adverb 
VB: Verb 
temb: Minimum value of cosine similarity of embedding vectors of two words 
tbert: Minimum value of prediction probability of missing words using BERT [13] 
POS: Parts of Speech 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the algorithms and different strategies related to 
both white-box and black-box settings. In Section 3, we discuss the experiments performed showing the 
effect of algorithm on different machine learning models. We extend this with some discussion on the 
experimental results and in Section 4, we conclude the paper with some insights and direction for future 
work. 
2 Attacks and algorithms 
We introduce a rule-based algorithm to create white box and black box attacks that do not change the 
semantics of the document. The white box attacks are categorized into two strategies as Replacement 
and Insertion. In the Replacement strategy, we replace some tokens in the targeted dataset, while for 
Insertion, we insert some tokens in the dataset. The black box attacks are designed by using common 
patterns from the replacement strategy of the white box attacks. We collect some common rules from 
the replacement strategy and apply those rules to create black box attacks.  
The first step in both replacement and insertion strategies is to find universal triggers [12] constrained by 
predefined rules. We apply universal trigger algorithm to find a list of triggers that increase overall loss 
for the test sample (i.e. find triggers which when applied in isolation causes the loss to increase and thus 
indicate a potential towards model flipping behavior). Specifically, we use a projected gradient descent 
method to find the list of universal triggers (or tokens) in the embedding space that affect the model 
decision the most. Specifically, consider a word 𝑤𝑗  and let 𝑒𝑗  denote its word embedding. Let L be a  
suitable loss function and ∇𝑒𝑗𝐿  be its projected gradient. We use an iterative method in the positive 
gradient direction to find the appropriate word trigger, subject to the perturbation being constrained to 
be in embedding space. Given a vector 𝑒𝑖
𝑗, we find the next word (𝑒𝑖+1
 𝑗 ) using the dot product of 
(𝑒𝑖+1
 𝑗 −  𝑒𝑖
𝑗) with the gradient (∇𝑒𝑖𝑗𝐿 )   vector. We take steps in the direction of gradient (of loss) with 
the additional condition that they must satisfy some predefined rules related to the sequence of POS tag 
of the tokens. This algorithm, modified form of universal trigger algorithm [12], is called the global strategy 
and is described below: 
I. Initialize the trigger sequence by using the words like “the”, the character “a”, or the sub-word 
“an” and concatenate the trigger to the front or end of all inputs. 
II. Replace the trigger sequence using rule based search over the embedding space and find the 
tokens by the following equation: 
argmin
𝑒  𝑖+1𝑗∈ 𝑉  
[𝑒𝑖+1
𝑗 −  𝑒𝑖
𝑗] ∇𝑒𝑖𝑗𝐿   
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑔(𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝑤
1 … 𝑤𝑗. . )) = 𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠 
Here, we take L to be the logistic loss function: L = −𝑦𝑙𝑜𝑔?̂? − (1 − 𝑦)𝑙𝑜𝑔(1 − ?̂?);   
i is the step in iteration;  
 
Figure 1: Schematic diagram of the algorithms introduced in this paper. Li, e’, w’, V represent loss, 
embedding vector for a word, selected word, and vocabulary of the dataset respectively 
 
 
 
wj is the j-th word in the trigger sequence; 
eij represents the embedding vector of word, wj;  
y is the original label; and 
?̂? is the model prediction 
III. Find the word in the embedding space that satisfies the above conditions. 
IV. Apply rule-based search to find the best collection of tags that maximize the loss. 
V. Repeat steps (II - IV) until we reach maximum iterations or there are no more words in the 
vocabulary space that satisfy the conditions specified in II.  
2.1 Replacement – Create semantically equivalent triggers by replacing 
tokens 
 
Figure 2: An example of perturbation using Replacement strategy.  An adjective (good) in a (Adjective, 
Noun) pair is replaced with one of the trigger adjectives (fantastic) 
In the replacement strategy, we find triggers that will replace adjectives in the text, i.e., (POS(trigger) = 
adjective), using the global strategy described  in the algorithm above. We find semantically equivalent 
triggers that change the model decision.  The steps are as follows: 
1. Perform PoS tagging for each message in the target dataset. 
2. Find all (adj, NN) pairs in the message (PoS tagging). For example in the sentence below: 
Example Message: 
Sound stinks. If it weren't for the hassle of returning items I would return these. The only good 
thing about these is that it's easy to set up. You can't listen to any of your other speakers while 
you have these plugged in. They go into the headphone outlet of the stereo. I bought these to 
have additional sound outside. If you have an MP3 player and want to use it for that, it will 
probably work out better for you. But again the sound isn't all that great. 
(adj, NN) pairs – (good thing), (additional sound) 
3. [Candidate Selection] Derive a list of potential triggers for the adjective part using the 
universal triggers. We apply the following rules: 
a. The adjective in the message and adjective in the trigger should have same polarity. 
b. The cosine similarity between the two should be greater than a pre-defined 
threshold (temb) in the embedding space. In our experiments, we used a threshold of 
0.45 (temb  = 0.45)and GloVe embeddings [14] to represent words in the embedding 
space.    
c. Sort the list of potential triggers in order of decreasing cosine similarity. 
d. Example 
i. ('additional', 'sound'), List of options -> ['several', 'numerous', 'full', 
'possible', 'extensive', 'many', 'related', 'total', 'extra', 'few', 'able', 
'potential', 'various', 'likely', 'individual', 'specific'] 
ii. ('good', 'thing'), List of options -> ['strong', 'effective', 'successful', 'easy', 
'impressed', 'clear', 'pleased', 'happy', 'important', 'comfortable', 'certain', 
'useful', 'positive', 'fantastic', 'solid', 'healthy', 'free', 'nice', 'great', 'safe', 
'true'] 
e. [Candidate Replacement] Replace an adjective with each trigger and test if the 
message flips. For example, an (adj, NN) trigger is (additional, sound) and [many, 
extra, full, total] is a list of potential triggers which can replace “additional” in the 
original message to flip the model prediction. 
f. BERT masked Language model is used to find the possible candidates which retain 
syntax and semantics of the sentence. We use the BERT prediction of missing words 
and select words whose prediction probability is greater than tBERT. We use a tBERT 
equal to 1e-3 in this experiment. An example is shown in Table 3. 
Table 3: Words with BERT prediction probabilities greater than tBERT are selected 
Input sentence Input options BERT prediction 
probability 
Selected 
I bought these to have [MASK] sound 
outside 
many 3.76e-05 No 
extra 0.01442 YES 
full 0.00021 No 
total 5.21e-05 No 
 
We have also tested other rules for replacement including (Adverb, Adjective), (Noun, Verb).  This is a 
general strategy in which other rules can also be included easily.  
2.2 Insertion – Create semantically equivalent triggers by inserting 
tokens 
 
Figure 3: An example of perturbation using Insertion strategy. It shows an adverb (fantastic) is inserted 
before an adjective (thing) using the Insertion strategy 
For insertion, we use the global strategy to find triggers that follow the Rule = POS(trigger1, trigger2) = 
(Adverb, Adjective). In the description below, we illustrate only the Adjective part of the trigger to find 
the semantically equivalent adjectives in the dataset. The steps are similar to the Replacement strategy 
with a few minor differences: 
1. Find all adj in the message (PoS tagging).  
2. [Candidate Selection]  Derive a list of potential triggers for the adjective part using the universal 
triggers by applying the following rules: 
a. The adjective in message and adjective in trigger should have the same polarity. 
b. The cosine similarity between the two should be greater than the embedding 
threshold (temb).  In our experiments, we used (temb = 0.45) and GloVe embeddings to 
represent words in the embedding space.    
c. Sort the list of potential triggers in order of decreasing cosine similarity. 
d. [Candidate Insertion] Insert the adverb from the trigger part of adverb in front of 
the candidate adjectives and test if the message flips.  
e. BERT masked Language model is used to filter the candidates which retain syntax 
and semantics of the sentence.  
For insertion, other strategies following different rules can also be used with the same steps described 
above as long as we maintain the semantics of the sentence.  
2.3 Black-box attack – Rules to attack black box models 
In this section, we collect all the rules that were successful in changing the decision of the trained model. 
We generalize these rules and apply to the same dataset and test them on other text classification models. 
A rule is comprised of pair of words and takes the form, for example, r = [(Noun, b) → (Noun, c)], where b 
is replaced by c for every instance that includes (Noun, b) as shown in Table 4. The output of every text 
after applying rule r changes all instances of (Noun, b) to (Noun, c). Table 4 presents some of the rules 
that are used and applied to the sentences. The rule, r = [(good, Noun) → (fantastic, Noun)] changes all 
(good, Noun) pairs in the sentences to (fantastic, Noun) and similarly other rules are applied to all the 
sentences.  
Table 5 presents one example of semantic-preserving adversaries by applying the three strategies, 
Replacement, Insertion and the rule [good, Noun) → (fantastic, Noun)]. In all the shown cases, the model 
decision changes from negative review to positive review although the complete meaning of the sentence 
is not changed. The “New” sentences still maintain the negative polarity that represent the negative 
review and would be difficult for a human to differentiate from the original message. 
3 Experiments 
3.1.1 Dataset 
The two strategies in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 can be applied to any differentiable deep learning (DL) model. 
Here we focus on three different DL models for classifying text documents. The first is a Convolution 
Neural Network (CNN) introduced  in [15] for text classification, the second model is a stacked two-layer 
LSTM model, and the last one is DistillBERT, a transformer architecture [16].These are popular machine 
learning algorithms used for text classification problems and to extract features from the dataset in 
different ways.  We apply the first two strategies on CNN networks and use the results to derive general 
Table 4: Black-box rules obtained from the Replacement strategy that successfully flipped the 
model decision 
Black box rules (Adj, NN) 
Original Pair  Replaced Pair 
good [Noun]  
nice [Noun]   
first [Noun]   
small [Noun]  
smooth [Noun] 
→ 
→ 
→ 
→ 
→ 
fantastic [Noun] 
good [Noun] 
second [Noun] 
tiny [Noun] 
soft [Noun]   
 
 
rules. These rules are then used as a black-box attack for the other two models (i.e. 2-layer LSTM and 
DistillBERT). More details related to the CNN model are provided in Table 6. The LSTM model is a two-
layer bidirectional model with 100 hidden layer units.  
CNN and LSTM models were trained with Adam optimizer [17] along with gradient clipping. DistillBERT 
has half the number of layers compared to the 12 layers of BERT-small. [13] The remaining 
implementation details are same as BERT. The contextual nature of transformer architecture is assumed 
to create a more robust model as it has less dependence on independent contributions. We use the 
dataset on electronics product reviews from Amazon [18] which is a subset of a large Amazon review 
dataset (see http://riejohnson.com/ cnn_data.html). See Table 7 for more details. 
Following an earlier setup, [19], we use only the text section and ignore the summary section. We also 
consider only positive and negative reviews.  More details are provided in Table 7. The machine learning 
models and adversarial perturbations discussed in the paper were developed using PyTorch [20] 
framework and huggingface transformer library [21]. 
3.1.2 Sentiment Analysis 
This section illustrates the utility of rule-based semantically equivalent triggers with application to 
sentiment analysis. We show both white box attack and black box attack for the Amazon review dataset 
Table 5: Examples of a reversed model decision by using the three strategies, Replacement, Insertion and 
black-box attack using the rule (good [NN] -> fantastic [NN]) 
Methods Previous Message New Message 
Replacement Sound stinks. If it weren't for the hastle of 
returning items I would return these. The 
only good thing about these is that it's easy 
to set up. You can't listen to any of your 
other speakers while you have these plugged 
in. They go into the headphone outlet of the 
stereo. I bought these to have additional 
sound outside. If you have an MP3 player 
and want to use it for that, it will probably 
work out better for you. But again the sound 
isn't all that great. 
 
Probability = 0.631151 
Sound stinks. If it weren't for the hastle of 
returning items I would return these. The 
only useful thing about these is that it's easy 
to set up. You can't listen to any of your 
other speakers while you have these plugged 
in. They go into the headphone outlet of the 
stereo. I bought these to have additional 
sound outside. If you have an MP3 player 
and want to use it for that, it will probably 
work out better for you. But again the sound 
isn't all that great. 
 
Probability = 0.472134 
Insertion Tele Type WorldNav 3100 Deluxe GPS is 
not beneficial GPS for the navigation 
because it doesnot provide the basic services 
such as Transportation like Taxis, Amtrak, 
Recreation, etc. So I can rate this product 
0000000000000. 
 
Probability = 0.758428 
Tele Type WorldNav 3100 Deluxe GPS is 
not enormously beneficial GPS for the 
navigation because it doesnot provide the 
basic services such as Transportation like 
Taxis, Amtrak, Recreation, etc. So I can rate 
this product 0000000000000. 
 
Probability = 0.351217 
Semantic rules 
 
good [Noun] => fantastic [Noun] 
The device is easy to use, but selection of a 
station to listen to with good reception is 
difficult. when driving in rural areas, can get 
some reception for a while. but need to 
change stations frequently to maintain 
reception. in city areas, very poor reception. 
susceptible to much interference. i like the 
design, but there is too much static on the 
reception to make listening enjoyable. 
 
 
Probability = 0.556183 
The device is easy to use, but selection of a 
station to listen to with fantastic reception is 
difficult. when driving in rural areas, can get 
some reception for a while. but need to 
change stations frequently to maintain 
reception. in city areas, very poor reception. 
susceptible to much interference. i like the 
design, but there is too much static on the 
reception to make listening enjoyable. 
 
 
Probability = 0.325465 
 
(Table 7). In the first case we apply the algorithm on a CNN model and collect the rules as described above. 
The rules are then applied to trained LSTM and DistillBERT models. For comparison, note that the original 
accuracies of the trained CNN, LSTM and DistillBERT models on the test dataset are 90.1, 89.0 and 93.1 
respectively. 
Table 6: Parameters of machine learning models 
General Model Parameters 
Vocabulary size 68,218 
Embedding dimension 300 
Dropout rate 0.2 
Maximum Sequence length  256 
CNN Model 
Hidden layers  1(10 neurons) 
Filters 1, 2, 3, 4 
Number of filters 50 per filter 
LSTM Model 
Hidden Dimension 100 
LSTM layers 2 
 
Table 7:  Information on Dataset 
Classes Data Samples (per class) Training data Testing data 
Two  Positive 37472 
 Negative 37472 
 Positive 18376 
 Negative 18376 
 Positive 18376 
 Negative 18376 
 
3.1.3 White box Attacks 
Table 8: Replacement results from different rule choices. The different rules, on average, cause a drop of 
~3% in the accuracy of model 
 
Table 8 shows the results for six different replacement strategies to change words in the target dataset. 
For example, the rule (Adv, Adj1)  (Adv, Adj2) refers to the replacement of adjective in the pair. Similarly 
(Adv, NN1) (Adv, NN2) refers to the replacement of nouns in the pair. We followed the procedure 
described above to maintain the semantic equivalence between the original sentence and the perturbed 
sentence (i.e. the sentence obtained after replacement in original sentence). See, for example, Table 5.  
The different replacement strategies result in degradation of the order of ~1-3%. -- changing from 90.1 to 
values ranging from 86.2 to 89.2.   The (Adj1, NN)  (Adj2, NN) rule creates the maximum decrease from 
90.1 to 86.2. 
Replacement – Changing words with similar words 
 Original 
Accuracy 
(Adv, Adj
1
)  
  
(Adv, Adj
2
) 
(Adv
1
, Adj) 
 
(Adv
2
, Adj) 
(Adj
1
 ,NN) 
 
(Adj
2
 , NN) 
(Adj ,NN
1
) 
  
(Adj, NN
2
) 
(VB
1
, NN) 
 
(VB
2
, NN) 
(VB, NN
1
)  
(VB, 
NN
2
) 
Amazon 90.1 87.6 87.9 86.2 87.2 88.7 89.2 
Table 9: Insertion strategy causes ~3% drop in accuracy. The two cases show an insertion of an adverb in 
front of an adjective and an insertion of an adjective after an adverb 
 
Table 9 shows results for the insertion strategy: inserting an adverb in front of adjective or inserting an 
adjective behind adverb. Both types of insertions cause an appreciable drop in the accuracy of the model 
of about ~3%.  
3.1.4 Black box Attacks 
For this case, we collected all the rules from the replacement strategy (Table 4) and applied them to two 
different models: LSTM model and DistillBERT. We also analyzed the performance changes by comparing 
the results with the amount of perturbation in the dataset. We quantified the perturbations with the 
number of words changed in the dataset: for example a single perturbation refers to a single word change 
locally. Table 10 shows the results. We can see that replacing one word does not affect DistillBERT results 
but decreases the performance of LSTM-based model by as much as ~4%. However, as we increase the 
number of perturbations, the performance of DistillBERT also starts to degrade and after four changes, 
the number of flips obtained from DistillBERT is similar to the flips obtained from white box attacks. The 
stable behavior of DistillBERT with respect to a single-word change can be attributed to the contextual 
nature of the transformer model. Single-word replacements does not  cause a significant model flipping 
behavior because of the multi-head attention mechanism in transformer-based architectures as a single 
word representation is a contribution of surrounding words [22]. However, as more words are replaced, 
the performance of the model drops which is a concern for transformer based models.  
Table 10: Comparison of black-box attack results on two different models, LSTM and DistillBERT with 
white-box attack result on CNN model 
Amazon dataset 
Number of changes CNN LSTM DistillBERT 
0 90.1% 89.1% 93% 
1 87.4 (-2.7%) 86.1 (-3%) 92(-1%) 
2 85.9 (-4.2%) 85.2(-4.1%) 90.4(-2.6%) 
3 85.7 (-4.4%) 84.9(-4.3%) 88.4(-4.6%) 
4 Conclusions and Future Directions 
We have presented three novel strategies to create semantically similar adversarial perturbations in the 
context of NLP problems. Although perturbations maintain the context and meaning of the text, they can 
cause, sometime significant, degradation in model performance.  
Our approach can be used to create both white-box and black-box attacks, and it can be applied to any 
machine learning model.  The rule-based approach presented also shows a sequence of steps to maintain 
Insertion – Inserting words into the sentence 
 Original Accuracy (Adj)  
  
(Adv, Adj) 
(Adv)  
 (Adv, Adj) 
Amazon 90.1 87.2 86.2 
the quality of perturbations, which can be easily be adapted to any perturbation scheme and used to 
maintain the semantics of the text.   
Our experiments are limited, and more work is needed to quantify the full extent of model robustness for 
the different DL algorithms and types of attacks. In future work, we plan to apply this approach to a variety 
of text classification datasets and NLP tasks.  
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